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FORWARD 
Within the  broader framework of the IIASA project "Comparative Analysis 
of Economic Structure and Growth" a series of studies concerned with 
contemporary labor market developments in advanced economies and of 
labor force consequences of and implications for structural economic 
change has been undertaken. These studies are motivated especially by 
the observation that,  despite significant differences in many dimensions, 
advanced economies confront a number of similar realities. Perhaps one 
of the  most fundamental of these common realities is that,  almost 
without exception, these economies have entered or are entering periods 
of very low rates of labor force growth. Especially in light of the  preced- 
ing period of relatively rapid growth, this transition to  lower growth 
creates the possibility of major disequilibria. The present paper provides 
an overview of postwar labor market developments and of future pros- 
pects. Subsequent papers will provide more detailed analyses of particu- 
lar facets of these developments and prospects. 
Anatoli Smyshlyaev 
Project Leader 
Comparative Analysis of Economic Structure and Growth 
PREFACE 
This paper constitutes a draft, introductory chapter of a planned mono- 
graph on labor market developments in advanced economies in the last 
half of the Twentieth Century. As such, it provides only an interpretive 
overview of developments in a highly stylized manner. A number of cru- 
cial arguments are only suggested or briefly outlined, only limited evi- 
dence is presented or referenced, and no attempt is made to "prove" 
important hypotheses. In particular, this general portrayal will not 
apply equally to developments in all countries, and even when the gen- 
eral characterization applies, differences in intensity and timing may 
well be significant. These nuances and qualifications will be more fully 
developed in the detailed chapters of the monograph. 
The conceptual origins of this analysis deserve a t  least brief reference. 
Vilfredo Pareto's name, clearly, is securely enshrined in contemporary 
neoclassical economics. However, since first reading those works of 
Pareto's available in English two decades ago, I have felt that ,  notwith- 
standing the significance of "Pareto optimality," coequal prominence 
should be awarded to the Paretian concept of the "circulation of elites." 
Moreover, although Paretian economics is rarely considered to be 
related in any functional way to Joseph Schumpeter's economic dynam- 
ics, and especially to the Schumpeterian concept of "creative destruc- 
tion," I immediately felt that the  two in fact were concerned with closely 
related facets of the same process. While that  relationship is only sug- 
gested in this paper. i t  provided the conceptual core to  the formulation 
developed here. The forthcoming monograph will develop the relation- 
ship between "creative destruction" and the "circulation of elites" more 
explicitly. 
Stephen P. Dresch 
Laxenburg, Austria 
My appreciation of the significant similarities which I perceive in 
developments in both East and West originated at a February 1983 
conference on "Higher Education and Employment in the USSR and the 
Federal Republic of Germany," and I am particularly indebted to Ulrich 
Teichler, director of the Wissenschaftliches Zentrum fiir Berufs- und 
Hochschul€orschung of the Gesamthochschule Kassel, sponsor (with the 
International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO, paris) of the 
conference, who made possible my attendance. The appreciation of 
East-West similarities was reinforced in the course of a December 1983 
Task Force Meeting on Strategic and Long-Term Planning in Innovation 
Management, held in Budapest, Hungary, and cosponsored by the IIASA 
project on innovation management, the Hungarian Committee for 
Applied Systems Analysis and the Ganz Electric Works, and I must  ack- 
nowledge my appreciation to  Vadim Goncharov and Tibor Asboth for their 
invitation to this meeting. 
My earliest thinking along the lines developed in this paper benefited 
from the encouragement and criticism of Dietrich Goldschmidt of the 
Max Planck Institut fiir Bildungsforschung, Berlin. Further stimulus was 
provided by Adair L. Waldenberg over a decade of close association. W. 
Lewis Hyde and the  late Derek de Solla Price provided a constant source 
of invaluable advice and criticism, influencing my thinking in ways that  
even I do not fully appreciate. 
The development and refinement of this analysis has benefited greatly 
from conversations with a number of IIASA colleages, especially Wolfgang 
Schopp, Marian Lescinsky, Anatoli Smyshlyaev, Erno Zalai and John Til- 
ton. IIASA may well be unique in providing, simultaneously. access to the 
breadth of experience necessary to provisionally test hypotheses of the 
type developed here and the freedom to pursue such exploratory ana- 
lyses. 
S.P.D. 
INTELLEmAL COMPEXENCE AND THE CIRCULATION OF EUTES: 
THE CRISIS OF THE LATE TWENTJETH CENTURY 
Stephen P. Dresch 
In virtually all societies positions occupied by individuals differ in the 
authority and responsibility exercised and in rewards received. Ranked 
according to  their  associated degrees of authority, responsibility and 
reward, positions in any regime (system, organization or order) consti- 
tute  a de j u r e  or de f a c t o  hierarchy. With reference to these hierarchies, 
two cardinal developments characterize the period from the second 
world war through, roughly, 1970. First, instrumental, meritocratic cri- 
ter ia  for entry into and advancement within significant hierarchies pro- 
gressively displaced (although may well not have eliminated) noninstru- 
mental social, cultural arid political criteria. Second, in most societies 
the  deniand for persons to fill positions in the upper tiers of the esta- 
blished hierarchies increased (temporarilly) a t  rates  significantly 
greater than  the rate of population and labor force growth. 
The f irs t  of these developments, the movement from nonmerito- 
cratic to meritocratic criteria, was the result primarily of the growing 
importance of instrumental capabilities (ability, knowledge and exper- 
tise) in ever wider spheres of social and economic activity, arid, to  a 
lesser extent, of the  necessity of legitimating differences in social status 
(as reflected in differential authority, responsibility and rewards) in the 
face of an increasingly egalitarian, democratic social and political 
ethos.' However, this development also had the consequence of greatly 
increasing the proportion of the population for which meritocratic 
achievement was a significant individual objective, a measure of self- 
worth and source of selfjustification. Concomitantly, i t  created the 
expectation tha t  meritocratic achievement would be a n d  wouLd c o n t i n u e  
t o  be recognized and rewarded by society. 2 
'While increased reliance on meritocratic criteria for the  assignment of individuals t o  posi- 
tions of high authority, responsibility and reward represented in part a response to an egali- 
tarian social ethos, there was also a significant elemenr of conflict between the meritocratic 
and the egalitarian ethos. This conflict had several sources, among the  most important of 
which were (1) an egalitarian belief that differentials in authority, responsibility and re- 
wards were essentially unjustified p e t  se (a view characteristic of "populist" movements in 
the  United States), and (2) recognition that ,  a t  least in the "short run" (possibly measured 
in generations), meritocracy would preserve existing differences in status associated with, 
e.g., race and class, simply because of differences in the  rate and efficiency of parental in- 
vestments in the capabilities of children. While the  first was reflected in  (generally frustrat- 
ed) at tempts to  e rad ica te  or deny differences in authority, responsibility and reward (as, 
e.g., in the  "cultural revolution" in  China), the second was reflected (a) in the provision of 
differential access of persons from specific class backgrounds (e.g., peasants, workers, racial 
minorities) t o  noniamily investments in meritocratically-rewarded capabilities (education 
and training) and (b) in compensatory, reparatory recognition of such factors a s  class and 
race in the  application of meritocratic criteria. hterestingly, however, at  least in the Unit- 
ed States, while reparatory nonmeritocratic (actually, extrameritocratic, in that the ulti- 
mate legitimacy of meritocratic criteria was not rejected) criteria were frequently utilized 
and accepted wi-h reference to  access t o  lower-level positions (and the acquisition of the 
competencies required for these), intrusions on meritocratic selection wer~commonly re- 
jected with reference to  high level positions. This difference in the  perceived acceptability 
of nonmeritocratic criteria is clearly indicated in t he  U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the 
Weber and Bakke cases, the first of which involved preferential access of blacks to  a joint 
company-union training program, the  second similarly preferential access to a state medi- 
cal school. These cases, and their implications, a re  discussed in Stephen P. Dresch, "Race 
'Reparations': The Upper Classes Win Again" (originally entitled "Bakke c o n f m  Weber: Social 
glass and Racial Policy"), ~ t i u n  a i e n c e  Monitor (November 6, 18'79). 
The degree t o  which belief in meritwratic selection and cornrnitment to rneritocratic 
achievernent was universalized clearly differed from society t o  society. Also, belief tha t  
selection would be meritocratic did not necessarily imply a commitment to meritocratic 
achievernent, or vice versa. Thus, nonmeritocratic, affective (e.g., social, political, racial) 
The second development,  t h e  rapid expansion of demand  for person- 
nel  at the  upper t i e r s  of t he  significant social h ierarchies ,  reflected such  
factors as  t h e  postwar acceleration of technological and economic 
development, the  realization of which had  been re ta rded  over the  
preceeding period of depression and war, and  consequences  of the  war 
and  of pre- and  post-war political developments which served to  dec imate  
the s tocks  of highly capable labor inher i ted from the  past  and  effectively 
available in t h e  present .3  The resul tant  su rge  in demand  for technically 
highly-qualified labor c r ea t ed  an  environment  within which meri tocrat ic  
expectations,  initially, could be fulfilled. Thus, in t h e  early phase t he  
shift toward mer i tocra t i c  c r i t e r ia  may  have outweighed t he  effect of t he  
criteria continued to play more or less important roles in all societies, while values other 
than meritocratic achievement (e.g., class identification) influenced individual behavior. 
For present purposes, however, it is simply argued that in both dimensions the meritocratic 
tpfluence became significantly greater in the postwar period. 
In fact, three very different phenomena were operative in the expansion of demand for per- 
sons to occupy the upper tiers of the various social hierarchies. First, and most important- 
ly, those hierarchies which had traditionally been characterized by a large number of high 
relative to low status positions expanded relative to those hierarchies characterized by rela- 
tively narrow upper tiers; in the case of the US., and measuring the relative size of the 
upper tier by the proportion of a sector's labor force which is highly educated, this is 
demonstrated in Stephen P. Dresch, "Demography, Technology and Higher Education: To- 
ward a Formal Model of Educational Adaptation," Journal of Aliticcrl Economy (May 1975), 
in which it is shown that over 70 percent of the increase in the highly educated share of the 
labor force which occurred between 1929 and 1960 can be accounted for by shifts from sec- 
tors in which the highly educated had been relatively wirepresented into those in which the 
highly educated had been heavily represented, with the bulk of these shifts occurring 
between 1048 and 1969. Second, the upper tiers of most hierarchies expanded relative to 
the lower tiers, reflecting technological developments; in the U.S. this accounts for about 30 
percent of the 1929-1068 increase in the highly educated share of the labor force and was 
entirely concentrated in the post-1948 period. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the 
war itself may well have contributed quite directly to the postwar technological surge, in 
that war-time exigencies greatly accelerated the rate of technological advance and also that 
these exigencies created conditions under which resistance to innovation and its diffusion 
were greatly reduced; thus, the immedate postwar period not only witnessed the realization 
of one to two decades of delayed prewar development but may also have experienced 
developrnents which would have occurred o.nly slowly over the postwar period had the war 
not forced the process of development. Third, as noted, the war, pre- and post-war political 
developrnents and associated international migrations had served, for a number of coun- 
tries, to greatly erode the stock of incumbents in high level positions or to create extremely 
high rates of attrition (voluntary and/or involuntary), while the latter (high attrition) would 
have occurred in any event as a result of relatively low pre-war growth of most of these 
hierarchies, reflecting low or negative rates of economic, labor-force and/or population 
growth over much of the  inter-war period, resulting in age distributions in which the rela- 
tively old (and rapidly disappearing) were disproportionately represented. 
disproportionate growth of demand for persons to fill high-level posi- 
tions, with the result that  relative competence a t  all levels of these 
hierarchies actually increased as less capable premeritocratic incum- 
bents were replaced by meritocratically selected successors. 
However, with the continued expansion of these hierarchies, and 
especially of their upper tiers, at rates greater than those a t  which the 
number of persons competing for these positions increased, the level of 
competence and ability required to reach any level in any hierarchy 
declined markedly. as did the ages of incumbents a t  each level.* The 
most able and competent young entrants quickly reached very high lev- 
els, but even the relatively incompetent were able to  advance to posi- 
tions significantly higher than those which they would have been able to 
secure had the  number of high-level positions expanded only a t  the rate 
a t  which the  cohort of aspirants expanded.5 Thus, over much of this 20 to 
4 ~ h e  critical point here is that, for any group (e.g., age cohort), competence and ability are 
not uniform across members of the group. By implication, if selection is meritocratic, then 
an increase in the proportion selected must necessarily result in a decline in competence 
and ability of the marginal (last) individual selected. With reference to  the decline in age, a 
somewhat more complex argument is imbedded. Specifically, it is assumed that the com- 
petencies and abilities valued in positions of authority and responsibility require not only 
"innate" (predetermined, but not necessarily genetically predetermined) capabilities but 
also those capabilities acquired through investment (e.g., in education and training) and 
that efficiency in human capital investment activities is a positive function of innate capa- 
bilities. Two consequences follow. First, as innate capabilities decline (at the margin), it 
will not be efficient to fully compensate by increasing human capital investment. Second, 
because the return to such investment will depend upon the expected duration of labor 
force participation, the level of investment which is optimal for a younger individual will 
exceed that which is optimal for an  equally innately able older individual. Thus, as com- 
petencies of younger individuals decline, this may lead to  increased levels of investment in 
older individuals, but the marginal younger individual at any hierarchical level will always 
be less able and will embody greater investment than the marginal older individual a t  that 
level. A s  a result, while the rapid growth of demand for persons to occupy the upper tiers of 
the various social hierarchies may have led to increased recruitment of older individuals. 
the predominant source was provided by the relatively young, notwithstmding the decline 
competence at  the margin. 
%he differential between the very high rate of growth of demand for persons to occupy 
hight-level positions and the rate of growth of supply of younger labor force ent.rants was 
severely exacerbated by the very low and frequently negative rate of growth of the entrant 
cohort, reflecting fertility declines and related phenomena (e.g., restrictions on immigra- 
tion) in the inter-war period. Thus, for example, the 18 year-old cohort in the United States 
contracted a t  a rate of about 0.5 percent per year between 1840 and 1960. 
30 year period occupants of high-level positions became both younger 
and less able and  competent.  
While the  declines in t he  abilities and competencies of persons in 
high-level positions might well be considered a cost of this pattern of 
development, character ized by the rapid expansion of the upper t iers  of 
important social hierarchies, this cost was a t  least partially offset by the 
concomitant shift to more meritocratic selection. Moreover, for esta- 
blished orders t h e  rapid growth of high-level positions and increasing 
meritocracy in  selection together had the  compensatory benefit of offer- 
ing expanding opportunities to  those of high and even mediocre ability. 
This fact had  important stability implications. The efforts of even margi- 
nally talented, capable individuals were fully absorbed within established 
(often newly-established) orders, insuring tha t  these kalents and capabil- 
ities would not  be utilized in opposition to or to undermine the  esta- 
blished order. Thus, i t  c an  be argued that ,  if declines in levels of ability 
and competence a t  progressively higher levels reduced the  efficiency of 
these systems, these declines in efficiency were probably more than  
offset, for purposes of preserving the  status quo ,  by the  reductions in 
instability resulting from (and/or in resources necessary to neutralize 
the covert or overt  opposition of) talented individuals deprived of oppor- 
tunities within existing hierarchies. 
Parenthetically, it can be observed that ,  while this pat tern of 
development may have involved ne t  benefits from the  vantage point of 
existing regimes, i t  may well have entailed ne t  costs from a broader 
social vantage point. Although society may also benefit from the  
increased stability of significant hierarchiesB6 the capacity of existing 
'~ iven established institutional arrangements, the degree to which society benefits will 
depend heavily on the. resources available to existing hierarchies to defend themselves 
hierarchies to absorb talent may also serve to constrain the expression 
of tha t  talent. Thus, major innovations, which are  frequently (and argu- 
ably necessarily) inconsistent with the perpetuation of an unchanged 
internal and external s t ructure of existing hierarchies, may be retarded 
or foreclosed if large fractions of the abilities and competencies required 
for innovation are  instead fully devoted to the maintenance of the exist- 
ing order. Stated somewhat differently, to the degree to which advances 
involve a Schumpeterian process of "creative destruction," the rate of 
advance will be retarded by the capacity of threatened institutions to 
absorb (and coopt) potentially disruptive talent. 7 
This adverse impact of the rapid expansion of demand for talent was 
magnified by its very uneven incidence. Thus, declines in competence 
were not experienced uniformly in all spheres and sectors of activity. 
Three exceptions deserve particular note. First, historically protected 
occupations enjoying monopoly privileges (e.g., medicine in the United 
States), to which access had  traditionally been rationed to a significant 
extent  on nonmeritocratic grounds (i.e., on grounds of wealth and class), 
shifted quickly to meritocratic rationing on grounds of ability and effec- 
tive competence. Responding to  social changes which, while not  elim- 
inating monopoly privileges, dictated that  these be distributed on 
against external (from the vantage point of the hierarchies) threats, in that this will largely 
determine the degree to which the activities of "disenfranchised" talent are de~oted  to so- 
cially noncreative (as opposed to creative) destruction, as will be discussed. The degree of 
perceived social benefit will also depend upon the weights attached to the values of various 
qarties in society. 
The adverse consequences of the increasingly exhaustive absorption of talent within exist- 
ing hierarchies for the rate of innovation and dynamic advance may well be mitigated or 
mqnified by the nature of the relationships between different social hierarchies. Thus, 
direct or indirect competition between "coequal" hierarchies may induce an internal organ- 
ization and orientation conducive to innovation, simply in the interest of the preservation 
or strengthening of the hierarchy vis- a-wis its competitors. In contrast, noncompeting, 
mutually supporting and reinforcing hierarchies may be especially prone to the internal 
neutralization and sterilization of talent and minimization of innovation. 
socially noninvidious, "egalitarian" bases, this development served to 
siphon increasing proportions of the very highly capable away from other 
(generally more productive) sectors and activities. 8 
Second, those activities directly financed by and of high priority to 
the s ta te  were able to bid the highly competent away from other sectors. 
In addition to direct government employment (civilian and military), 
this  was especially the case in areas of science deemed to be critical to 
national security. Thus, international political developments, specifi- 
cally, the  commencement of the Cold War, contributed in a particularly 
destabilizing manner,  exacerbating shortages of highly competent labor 
which would have occurred in any event. Whether the  effect of this 
channeling of a rising fraction of the  highly talented into scientific and  
technological activities which contributed to military capabilities was 
adverse from a nonmilitary perspective is, of course, open to question. 
On the one hand, as  in the  case of World War 11, military considerations 
may have accelerated technological developments with significant civi- 
lian applications, in effect mobilizing ta lent  which would otherwise have 
been relatively unexploited (or, a t  least, less effectively exploited).g On 
B ~ o  a significant extent the embracing of meritocratic criteria for access to  monopoly 
privileges in the protected professions represented only a nominal development, undertaken 
t o  conform only in appearance and ideology to the social demand for egalitarian access and 
t o  preserve monopoly protections. Thus, the need to adequately "reward" ostensibly neces- 
sary high-level talent in professions such as medicine justified their monopoly status, when 
nonrneritocratic criteria for entry might well have resulted in a societal decision to elim- 
inate monopoly protections. Moreover, given the capacity of the affluent to invest differen- 
tially in the  capabilities of their children, the actual class (althoughd probably not individu- 
al) identities of persons granted access may have been effectively unaltered by the shift to 
meritocratic selection. To the degree to which individual identities were affected, this prob- 
ab!y represented an inefficient rechanneling of the most able into the protected professions, 
when, in the absence of meritocratic selection, the most able would have had a comparative 
8dvmtage (over their duller class peers) in nonprotected spheres. 
One might even eo so far as to argue that the absence of Cold War motivations for the  
development of military technology would have reinforced the developing separation of "sci- 
ence" and "technology" (discussed below), resulting in an even greater neutralization of 
science (and of increasingly scientific "technology") than in fact occurred. At the least, 
militarilly-oriented scientific activity served to partially limit the relative scope of the in- 
the other  hand, it is clear tha t  whatever civilian benefits derived from 
militarilly-driven technological developments could have been achieved 
more efficiently (a t  lesser resource cost) had they been obtained 
directly rather  than as an indirect spin-off of militarilly-oriented tech- 
nology (although the reduced resources required for directly civilian 
technological development might not have been forthcoming). 10 
Third, and related to the  first two in that  it relied both on monopoly 
protections and on direct subvention by the state, the academic estab- 
lishment was capable initially of bidding increasing proportions of the 
highly capable away from other  spheres of activity. Enjoying extremely 
strong demand for i ts  teaching functions, precisely because of the pre- 
vailing excess demand for  intellectually competent labor." and 
accounting for a large share of the more fundamental research deemed 
critical to national security, earnings and other perquisites of academic 
employment irnproved dramatically in the postwar period, increasing the 
relative attractiveness of academic employment. 12 
In short, while many sectors experienced severe shortages of intel- 
lectually competent labor and, thus,  declines in competence at  all levels, 
the proportion of the  highly capable at t racted into what were, generally, 
economically "nonproductive" activities (professions enjoying protected 
~beasingly internally-oriented academic science monopoly. 
In effect, military considerations served t o  "internalize" benefits of tec,hological 
development (at the governmental level) which, in the absence of a direct governmental in- 
terest, would have been largely external ( to potentially initiating corporations and enter- 
prises). 
'In the face of an excess demand for highly educated labor the position of the academic 
sector is comparable to  tha t  of the  physical capital goods sector confronting an increase in 
investment demand, i.e., an accelerator effect operates. Of course, a failure of demand to  
c ntinue t o  expand also produces a magnified depressive effect, as will be indicated. 
l h e s e  and subsequent developments in t h e  U.S. academic labor market are documented 
in Stephen P,  Dreuch, "The Weakening of the Academic Labor Market and the Politicization 
of Academe," PS (Bulletin of the  American Political Science Association) (Summer 1983). 
monopoly privileges, civilian and military government employment,  
rnilitary-related research, and, progressively, the academic sector) rose 
significantly.13 However, even in these favored sectors the competence 
of marginal entrants  probably declined significantly, a t  least in the  
latter part  of the expansionary period. 
At this stage one can only speculate concerning the consequences of 
this progressively more effective postwar "sterilization" of highly com- 
petent labor within the protected professions, government, "pure" sci- 
ence and academe. However, i t  could only reinforce the  generally "con- 
servative" tendencies associated with the all-embracing absorption of 
talent within established hierarchies. Thus, the siphoning of talent into 
"nonproductive sectors" resulted in even more severe declines in corn- 
petence within the hierarchies of the "productive" sectors and  in even 
lesser residues of talent outside of established hierarchies. 
Sirnultaneously, the  academic and scientific establishments became 
effectively insulated from productive spheres, an insulation made possi- 
ble by their socially and  politically favored positions (and hence direct 
command over resources). l4 This insulation greatly reduced their  
13'I'he term "unproductive'' i s  used here quite loosely. Roughly speaking, i t  includes those 
components of economic activity which are included in t he  Western concept of gross domes-  
t i c  product but are excluded in the  socialist (Soviet and Eastern European) concept of n e t  
makerid prcduct.  More substantively, i t  rests on a conception of activities which would 
nominally be considered to be of the form of nonmaterial investments, when these invest- 
ments have extremely low (zero or negative) ret .nns of the margzn. Thus, for example, the  
late Derek de Solla Price has  documented the very marginal contribution t o  scientific 
knowledge made by the  marginal scientist, while silbstantial evidence is  available concern- 
ing the very trivial contribution t o  health made by physicians and other medical specialists. 
Finally, the academic sector is "productive" only when the productivity of educated indivi- 
duals exceeds the productivity of the uneducated ' ~ y  a margin svfficient t o  rationaiize the  
costs of education. 
I4This insulation is  clearly indicated by changes in the sources of funding for academic 
research which took place in the U.S. over the 1850s and 1960s. 'I'hus, t he  industrial share of 
academic research funding declined from in excess of six percent in 1955 t o  about 2.5 per- 
cent in  1970, whle the Federal share increased from 40 percent to  70 percent. S imul t ane  
ously, the academic share of total national research and development activity increased 
from six to nine percent, while this aggregate increased in constant dollar by about 200 per- 
potential as a source of innovation. 15 
Thus, creative (and creatively destructive) capacities bot>h within 
and outside the productive sectors were seriously eroded. In this con- 
text it is certainly not preposterous to suggest tha t  the  progressively 
more effective sterilization of talent over t h e  course of the 1950s and 
1960s may well have contributed significantly, with a lag, to the decline 
in ra tes  of innovation and of productivity growth which occured after the 
late 1960s. 16 
At some point between the mid-1960s and  the  mid-1970s, however, 
the situation which had prevailed over t he  preceding postwar period 
(characterized by the  progressively more exhaustive absorption of talent 
by existing hierarchies) radically altered. First, t he  expansion of the 
upper t iers  of these hierarchies came t o  a r a t h e r  sudden halt.17 Second, 
the number  of competitors for these positions began t o  expand much 
cent. Data on U.S. research and development expenditure, including sources of funds and 
sectors of performance, are presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Satistical Abstract of 
h i t e d  Sates, [Yew] (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, annual). 
the United States the passage of the National Science Foundation Act in 1850 has par- 
ticularly important real and symbolic significance in this context. First, i t  marked the end 
of the World War I1 marriage between science and technology by granting primacy and in- 
dependence t o  the former. Second, i t  further eviscerated technology by including within its 
p e ~ e w  engineering, converting that field from a "technological" to a "scientific" discip 
@;is clearly should not be considered a "single-factor" explanation for the decline in prw 
ductivity growth, although other factors may have been directly or indirectly related to 
these developments. For example, increasing bureaucratization may well have contributed 
to  productivity decline but also resulted from declining relative competencies in the upper 
tiers of relevant hierarchies and from the protected, insulated state of these hierarchies. 
Similarly, the increasing internal orientation of academic research and teac'ning, reflected 
in the "publish or perish" phenomenon, certainly is largely attributable to  insulated 
a ademic affluence. 
"The reasons for this halt in expansion of the upper tiers cannot be fully discussed within 
the confines of this paper. To some degree it was a nscesscvy phenomenon, in that a com- 
ponent can only t e~pora r i l ly  grow at  a rate greater than that  of the aggregate of which it is 
a part. Also, this was, to some degree, an accelerator-type process, as suggested above with 
reference to the growth of demand for academic personnel; as a result, a decline LTI the 
"external" component of demand was reflected in a concomitant contraction in the inter- 
nal, endogenous component of demand. Most generally, the progressively greater costs of 
the expansion of upper hierarchical tiers inevitably served to constrain continued growth. 
more rapidly than  had been the case in t he  past.18 Thus, in contrast  to 
the first postwar period, in which the pool of potentially disruptive talent 
was effectively drained in the  process of fulfilling expanding demands for 
ability and  competence, this  pool has subsequently been expanding 
rapidly. The problem has actually been exacerbated by the  previous 
period of rapid growth of high-level positions: Because incumbents even 
a t  the highest levels a r e  relatively young (although aging rapidly), rates 
of attri t ion (losses to death and to the  social, physical and intellectual 
infirmities of age) a re  extremely low. Thus, there  is nei ther  an expan- 
sionary nor  a replacement  demand for persons of competence and ability 
within the  established orders. 
In summary,  established hierarchies a re  increasingly characterized 
by aging (but not aged), atrophying incompetents occupying their  higher 
tiers. In contrast ,  increasingly frustrated concentrations of talent have 
accumulated in  t h e  lower t iers and entirely outside of existing orders. 
Incompetence a t  t h e  higher levels of these hierarchies renders relatively 
ineffective their  a t tempts  to  control or  neutralize threa ts  from below 
and outside the  system, while these threa ts  (from within and without) 
become increasingly dangerous and potentially effective as  disenfran- 
chised ta lent  accumulates.  
The socially destabilizing consequences of these developments a r e  
greatly magnified by t h e  prior shift toward meritocratic criteria of selec- 
tion. First, as  opportunities for advancement have contracted, residual 
'%e expansion of the  number of competitors reflected the postwar surge in births, pro- 
ducing significant growth in the number of labor market entrants in the  1960s and 1970s, 
after one or two decades of relative stability or decline. Anticipating (incorrectly) a con- 
tinuation of an excess demand for the highly capable, these bloated cohorts were educated 
a t  rates which had previously been achieved. 
nonmeritocratic influences have become more pronounced (or a t  least 
more visible). Second, the expectations generated by meritocratic 
opportunity, apparently justified by the experiences of past cohorts, a re  
broadly shared, resulting in more widespread frustration than  these 
developments would have engendered in the premeritocratic period. 
Third, the degree of faith in the application of meritocratic criteria is 
further eroded by the  evidence of secure, entrenched incompetence in 
high-level positions. Thus, what in the past would have been a relatively 
confined frustration has become endemic, as the fraction of young labor 
force entrants  experiencing this foreclosure of opportunity has  dramati- 
cally increased. 
The most obvious evidence of the foreclosure of opportunity within 
the existing hierarchical structures, even for the highly talented, is the 
radical decline in the relative s tatus of younger members of the  labor 
force which has occured over the last ten  to 15 years. In contrast  to the 
preceding period, in which the s ta tus  distributions of successive cohorts 
of labor force entrants  equaled or exceeded those of their predecessors, 
and certainly exceeded those of their parents, the s tatus distributions of 
young entrants  have shifted downward rapidly. Large proportions even of 
the highly able and well-trained have been incapable of obtaining entry 
into any established hierarchy, and comparable proportions of those who 
have obtained entry either have found themselves permanently frozen 
into t h e  lower tiers of the system or  have occupied very precarious posi- 
a cases tions, confronting foreclosed upward mobility and the risk (in somt- 
virtual certainty) of displacement by subsequent entrants.  
In the  United S ta tes  th is  pa t te rn  of development is most evident in 
t h e  declining incomes of those  younger  members  of t he  labor force who 
a r e  most  capable and  highly educated.'' Thus, for example,  between 
1972 and  1979 annua l  incomes of e m p l o ~ : d  33 year-old males  with 17 or 
more years  of schooling (generally implying postbaccalaureate g radua te  
or professional training) declined (in constant  1972 dollars) from $17,190 
to  $12,876, for  a cumulat ive  decline of 25 percent  in  just seven years.  
For persons with 16 years  of schooling (completion of a baccalaureate  
degree), the  decline was f rom $13,666 to  $12,121, or by 11 percent ,  indi- 
cating t h a t  t h e  contract ion ha s  been grea tes t  for those  who might  have 
expected to  occupy the  h ighes t  positions. The lesser impact  for those  
aspiring to  (and t ra ined for)  lower s t a t u s  positions is clearly indicated by 
the  experiences of persons with only 12 years of schooling (high school 
graduates),  for whom incomes were virtually invariant over t h i s  period 
($10,044 in 1972 versus  $10,022 in 1979). That t h i s  has  been an experi- 
ence  only of t h e  young a n d  highly educated,  and does no t  reflect  a gen- 
e ra l  decline in  levels of real  income of persons with high levels of educa- 
tion, is  indicated by t he  fac t  t h a t  incomes of 45 year-olds with 17  years  of 
schooling increased f rom $19,968 t o  $22,001, o r  by 10 percent ,  between 
1972 and 1979. And, while incomes  of 45 year-olds with 1 6  years  of 
'The evidence presented in this paragraph is developed more thoroughly in Stephen P. 
Dresch, "Education and Lifetime Earnings: The Census Bureau's Misguided Misrepresenta- 
tions," Review o f  Public Data Use (December 1883), drawing on data published by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Current Popu la t ion  Reports ,  S4sries P-60, hb. 139,  f i f e t ime  h r n i n g s  
& t i m d e s  for  Men a n d  Women in th.e Unifed  S a t e s :  1979 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Prinung Oftice, 1983), and Current  f i p u l a t i o n  Reports,  & n e s  P-60, No. 92, Annual Mean h- 
c o m e ,  L4fetimo Income,  and Eiuca t iona l  A t ta inment  of Men in t h s  [mited S a t e s ,  f o r  S l e c t -  
e d  Years ,  I956  to 1972  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974). More detailed 
evidence, covering the period from the mid 1960s through the early lQBOs and examining 
evidence on intra- and inter-occupational earnings differentials, is presented in Stephen P. 
Dresch, Occupa t iond  Earnings ,  1967- 1981;  Returns  to C k c u p d i o n d  Choice, S h o o l i n g  a n d  
F h H c i m  4 e c i d i z d i o n  (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, forthcoming 1884). 
schooling declined over this  period from $19,042 t o  $18,301, or by six 
percent  (about  one-half the  relative decline experienced by 30 year- 
olds), 60 year-olds with 16 years of schooling enjoyed an increase of 14 
percent  (from $19,449 to  $22.096). 
This pat tern of development is becoming increasingly apparent in a 
number  of o ther  countries as well. In t h e  Federal Republic of Germany it 
is especially evident in rising rates of unemployment of university gra- 
duates ,  in prolongation of nominal s tudent  status,  in downward shifts in 
the  occupational distributions of graduates,  and in rising proportions of 
graduates  who do not enjoy conventional contracts of employment and 
hence  const i tute  a "grey market" for labor services." Similarly, in the 
Soviet Union there is accumulating evidence of enterprise accumula- 
t ions of "surplus stocks" of highly qualified personnel, while significant 
numbers  of young specialists, confronted by progressively less desirable 
opportunities for professional employment (less desirable in te rms ,  e.g., 
of location, conditions of work and  opportunities for advancement) have 
e lec ted  t o  pursue nonprofessional careers.  2 1 
In both the  Soviet Union and West Germany, and also in the U.S., the  
previous pat tern of rising educational aspirations and at ta inments  on 
the  part  of young people has given way to one of stability or decline, 
although this  development has been partially offset (or delayed) in the  
West by rising unemployment (with especially pronounced youth unem- 
''These and related developments in West Germany are summarized i n  U. Teichler and B. 
Sanyal, Higher Eblucdion and the Lahour Market in the f i d a r d  Republic of Germany (Paris: 
y y ~ s c o ,  I 002). 
The current Soviet situation is  summarized in D. Chuprunov, R. Avakov and 1':. Jiltsov, 
h h e r  Eblucdion, h p l o y m e n f  and lkchnologicd P ' g r e s s  in ths V S R  (Paris: UNESCO, 
1082). 
ployment) since the  late 1970s. encouraging many individuals to  persist 
in school (and hence to receive educational subsidies which constitute 
de fac to  unemployment compensation not contingent on prior work 
experience) when they would not have elected to do so had opportunities 
for employment been available. Thus, the precise manifestations of this 
overall pattern of development may differ somewhat, but the broad 
consequences are strikingly, and surprisingly, similar despite major 
differences in socia! and economic institutions. 
The foreclosure of opportunities for young labor force entrants  is 
most obvious in the more rigidly structured, hierarchical sectors, e.g., 
education and government. Thus, growing proportions of highly com- 
petent labor force entrants  have been drawn (or driven) into those sec- 
tors (generally the directly "productive" sectors) which had been rela- 
tively starved of talent in the  first two or three postwar decades, with 
potentially highly significant positive consequences for the  capacity for 
innovation within these sectors. This potential, however, may well be 
largely unrealized, in part because talent may be neutralized by the 
incapacity of existing structures to adapt internally to  the  requirements 
of innovation but also because i t  is in these sectors that  the contrast 
between the relatively high levels of competence in the lower tiers of the 
hierarchy and entrenched incompetence a t  higher levels is especially 
pronounced. While the tenure of high-level (and relatively incompetent) 
incumbents in these sectors is less formally protected, organizational 
rigidities and inertias still serve to greatly constrain the opportunities O F  
talented individuals at lower levels. 
Thus, realization of the potential for innovation may well take place 
primarily outside of established organizations and hierarchies (to the 
degree that  this potential is realized a t  all). The significant question 
from a social perspective concerns thy reactions which these pctential 
"independent" innovative activities will confront.22 If this type of 
activity is fostered and encouraged (or even tolerated), then it may well 
offer a socially constructive outlet for creative talent and bring a signifi- 
cant  acceleration of the ra te  of innovation in its wake. To the degree to 
which it is resisted, the  level of frustration will rise, and the prospect of 
socially noncreative destruction ( a t  least initially noncreative) will 
become more likely. 
The likelihood of severe instabilitity is particularly great for those 
sectors which expanded most  rapidly in the earlier postwar period. 
These sectors a re  now dominated by persons of relatively low levels of 
ability and competence (by comparison to the abilities and competencies 
of persons who could be recruited currently), and, although currently 
exhibiting very low attrition rates, will experience exceptionally high 
rates  of attrition as the  "clot" in the  age distribution created by rapid 
postwar expansion suddenly begins to  be eliminated. This characteriza- 
tion is especially descriptive of the  academic and scientific establish- 
ments and of many political elites and governmental bureaucracies, 
entities which came into existence and/or expanded very rapidly in the . 
'%'his is essentially a question of the  access of "disenfranchised talent" to resources, espe- 
cially investment resources. In this regard, the role of existing institutional (e.g., cor- 
porate) hierarchies a s  sources of investment in training and technological developmer~t 
which is then realized in new, independent entities initiated by talented individuals leaving 
the established prlrent institution is particularly significant. The developm.ent of capital 
market instruments, e.g., R&D limited partnerships, is also significant in this regard. 
first postwar decades. Even before these systems enter  the phase of 
rapid attrition of established personnel, stability is threatened by the 
relative inability of these sectors to absorb younger talent. And, even to 
the degr-e to which entry-level opportunities are offered to highly capa- 
ble members of younger cohorts, opportunities for internal upward 
mobility are virtually foreclosed by the relative youth and low attrition 
of the relatively less competent incumbents occupying positions higher 
in these hierarchies and by the failure of these hierarchies to continue 
to expand at  the rates  of the immediate postwar decades. This inability 
of provide for a "circulation of elites" (as i t  was classically characterized 
by Vilfredo Pareto) results in a growing concentration of highly capable 
individuals in the  lower tiers and outside of established power structures, 
creating the possibility of serious challenges to existing orders. Even if 
this threat  is avoided initially, the surge in attrition as the early postwar 
cohorts pass from the scene will lead both to increasing pressures from 
outside the system and to  increasing internal flux and uncertainty. 23 
23~oth external and internal sources of instability in the rapid turnover period are exacer- 
bated by the likely refusal of the highly talented to enter even the accessible lower tiers of 
these hierarchies, a refusal based on the recognition of (a) the dominance of high-level in- 
competence and (b) the short- and intermediate-term foreclosure of upward mobility. 
